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Talking Foreign Policy: North
Korea Summit
“Talking Foreign Policy” is a one-hour radio program,
hosted by the Dean of Case Western Reserve University School
of Law, Michael Scharf, in which experts discuss the important
foreign policy issues. The premier broadcast (airdate: March 1,
2012) covered the controversial use of predator drones,
humanitarian intervention in Syria, and responding to Iran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Subsequent broadcasts have
covered topics such as the challenges of bringing indicted tyrants
to justice, America’s Afghanistan exit strategy, the issue of
presidential power in a war without end, and President Obama’s
second term foreign policy team. This broadcast focused on the
U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Summit.……………………………………………….
The purpose of the radio show is to cover some of the most
salient foreign policy topics and discuss them in a way that can
make it easier for listeners to grasp. “Talking Foreign Policy” is
recorded in the WCPN 90.3 Ideastream studio, Cleveland’s
NPR affiliate. Michael Scharf is joined each session with a few
expert colleagues known for their ability to discuss complex
topics in an easy-to-digest manner:
• The ethicist: Shannon French, director of Case Western
Reserve’s Inamori Center for Ethics and Excellence;
• The Asian Studies expert: Professor Tim Webster, the
Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Case Western Reserve
University;
• The international law guru: Milena Sterio, Associate Dean of
The Cleveland Marshall College of Law; and
• The negotiator: Paul R. Williams, president of the Public
International Law and Policy Group.
Archived broadcasts (both in audio and video format) of
“Talking
Foreign
Policy”
are
available
at:
https://law.case.edu/TalkingForeignPolicy. The transcript of
the May 24, 2018 broadcast appears below.
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Talking Foreign Policy: North Korea Summit
May 24, 2018 broadcast 1
MICHAEL SCHARF: The United States and North Korea — two
countries that fought a brutal war and never made peace. No sitting
U.S. President has met with his North Korean counter-part; 2 but a
few months ago, North Korean president Kim Jong-un warned that
the whole of the United States was in range of his country’s nuclear
weapons, and President Trump responded by calling Kim “Little
Rocket Man” and threatening to annihilate his nation. 3 Then, in a
dramatic turnabout in March, the two leaders agreed to hold a
historic Presidential Summit. 4 But on May 24th, President Trump
announced that the Summit was off. 5 In this broadcast of Talking
Foreign Policy, we’ve assembled a panel of experts on peace
negotiations, national security, human rights, and Asian affairs to
discuss the prospects and pitfalls for a U.S. - North Korea Summit,
right after the news.
Welcome to Talking Foreign Policy. I’m your host Michael
Scharf, Dean of Case Western Reserve University School of Law. In
this broadcast, our expert panelists will be discussing the prospects
for a U.S.-North Korea Summit. For our program today, we’ve
assembled a panel of experts on peace negotiations, national security,
1.

Transcript edited and footnotes added by Cox Center Fellows Emma
Lawson, Alexander Peters, Courtney Koski, and Senior Cox Center
Fellow Alexandra Mooney.

2.

Robbie Gramer & Emily Tamkin, Decades of U.S. Diplomacy with
North Korea: A Timeline, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 12, 2018, 6:48 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/12/a-timeline-of-u-s-negotiationstalks-with-north-korea-trump-kim-jong-un-pyongyang-nuclear-weaponsdiplomacy-asia-security/.

3.

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2017, 7:25
AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/936209447747190784?ref_
src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E93620944
7747190784&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.latimes.com%2Fpolitics%
2Fla-pol-updates-everything-president-trump-calls-kim-jong-un-littlerocket-1512093131-htmlstory.html.

4.

Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2.

5.

Mark Landler, Trump Pulls Out of North Korea Summit Meeting with
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
24,
2018),
Kim
Jong-un,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/asia/north-korea-trumpsummit.html. Trump subsequently changed his mind and the Summit
was held on June 11, 2018 2018. For a summary of the Summit, see
David Jackson, US-North Korea Summit, USA TODAY (June 12, 2018),
available
at
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/11/singaporedonald-trump-kim-jong-un-denuclearization-summit/689817002/.
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human rights, and North Korean-U.S. diplomacy. Joining us from a
studio in Washington D.C. is Dr. Paul Williams, 6 the president of the
Public International Law and Policy Group—a Nobel Peace Prize
nominated NGO that has provided legal counsel in a dozen peace
negotiations over the past twenty-two years. 7 Welcome to the show
Paul!
PAUL WILLIAMS: Thanks, Michael. It’s my pleasure.
MICHAEL SCHARF: And in our studio in Cleveland, I’m joined by Dr.
Shannon French, 8 a former faculty member of the U.S. Naval
Academy who now directs the Inamori International Center for Ethics
and Excellence at Case Western Reserve University. She’s also
director of the nation’s first ever master’s program in Military Ethics. 9
Thanks for being with us, Shannon.
SHANNON FRENCH: Thanks, Michael. Happy to be here.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Also here with me is Professor Milena Sterio, 10 the
Associate Dean of Cleveland Marshall College of Law and renowned
international law expert. It’s good to see you again, Milena.

6.

Paul Williams, Faculty, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE
LAW, http://www.wcl.american.edu/faculty/pwilliams/ (last visited
Jan. 1, 2019). Paul R. Williams holds the Rebecca I. Grazier
Professorship in Law and International Relations at American
University. Professor Williams teaches at the School of International
Service and the Washington College of Law and also directs the joint
JD/MA program in International Relations. Prior to his arrival at
American University, Paul Williams served as a Senior Associate with
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fulbright
Research Scholar at the University of Cambridge.

OF

7.

PILPG,
available
https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/
Jan. 1, 2019).

8.

Shannon E. French, Ph.D., CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY,
https://case.edu/inamori/about-the-center/staff/shannon-french
(last
visited Jan. 1, 2019). Prior to her involvement in CWRU School of Law,
Shannon French taught ethics for eleven years at the United States
Naval Academy and served as Associate Chair of the Department of
Leadership, Ethics, and Law.

9.

Master of Arts in Military Ethics at Case Western Reserve University,
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY, http://militaryethics.case.edu/
(last visited Jan. 1, 2019).

10.

Milena
Sterio,
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL
COLLEGE
OF
LAW,
http://facultyprofile.csuohio.edu/csufacultyprofile/detail.cfm?FacultyID
=M_STERIO (last visited Jan. 1, 2019). Before joining ClevelandMarshall, Milena Sterio worked as an associate at Cleary, Gottlieb,
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MILENA STERIO: It is great to be here.
MICHAEL SCHARF: And, finally, we have Professor Tim Webster, 11 the
Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Case Western Reserve
University. Welcome, Tim.
TIM WEBSTER: Thank you, Michael.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, let’s begin with a short refresher on U.S.-North
Korean relations. When the Korean conflict ended in 1953, there was
no peace agreement—only an armistice. 12 Milena, as an international
law expert, can you tell us the implications of that?
MILENA STERIO: Sure. So, the Korean armistice agreement, which was
signed in 1953, was an agreement signed by the armies of North
Korea, China, and the United States, and that brought an end to the
hostilities to the war that was going on in Korea at the time.13
However, it was not a peace treaty signed by the respected
governments. Meaning that there were lots of unresolved issues that
did not end with the armistice. 14
MICHAEL SCHARF: And then in the aftermath, there was a massive
military build-up on both sides. There were landmines placed in the
demilitarized zone, and there was a lot of negative rhetoric, right? 15

Steen & Hamilton in New York City and as an Adjunct Law Professor
at Cornell.
11.

Timothy Webster, CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAW,
https://law.case.edu/Our-School/Faculty-Staff/Meet-OurFaculty/Faculty-Detail/id/1020 (last visited Jan 1, 2019). Before joining
Case, Timothy Webster was a lecturer at Yale Law School and senior
fellow at its China Law Center. He has held visiting professorships at
the University of Paris—Dauphine, National Taiwan University, and
Southwest University of Political Science and Law (Chongqing, China).

12.

Armistice Agreement for the Restoration of the South Korean State
DOCUMENTS,
(1953),
OUR
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=85
(last
visited Jan. 1, 2019).

13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.

Joori Roh & Josh Smith, North, South Korea Begin Removing
Landmines Along Fortified Border, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2018, 11:22 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-dmz/northsouth-korea-begin-removing-landmines-along-fortified-borderidUSKCN1MB1BG.
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MILENA STERIO: Exactly, and there was supposed to be a peace
treaty. The idea at the time was basically to end the conflict, sign the
armistice, and then negotiate a peace treaty. The problem is that that
peace treaty was never actually negotiated. So up to this date, there
is no peace treaty for Korea. 16
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, let’s fast-forward to the year 2002. That’s the
year that North Korea admitted to having a nuclear weapons
program, and it withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. 17 Paul, can you tell us what the significance of that would be?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, Michael, that was hugely significant. The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is essentially the cornerstone of
global nuclear security. 18 By exiting that treaty, North Korea was
essentially signaling that it was going to go nuclear, so to speak; and
it did. 19 And by exiting the treaty, all bets for verification, for
monitoring—those doors were all closed, and North Korea was
essentially able to aggressively pursue its nuclear program. 20
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well why would it want to do that?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Deterrence? The end of the conflict between the
U.S. and North Korea, as Milena had mentioned, was an armistice, it
wasn’t a peace deal. American troops remain in great numbers in
South Korea and have engaged in annual war gaming near the border.
North Korea wanted to basically have a nuclear weapons capability in
order to, one, protect itself; and two, to reshape the geo-political
environment on the Korean peninsula and in Asia. 21
MICHAEL SCHARF: It turns out, it wasn’t just bluffing, because in
2006, North Korea announced its first successful nuclear weapons

16.

Edward Wong, Why Is the U.S. Wary of a Declaration to End the
TIMES
(Aug.
13,
2018),
Korean
War,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/world/asia/korea-peace-treatytrump-us.html.

17.

Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2.

18.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968, 21
U.S.T.
483,
729
U.N.T.S.
161,
available
at
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text.

19.

Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2.

20.

Id.

21.

Why Does North Korea Want Nukes, HERITAGE (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.heritage.org/insider/summer-2018-insider/why-does-northkorea-want-nukes.
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test. 22 And in the following years, North Korea announced a number
of additional successful tests, including the underground explosion of a
hydrogen bomb. 23 Then it turned to testing long-range missiles.24
Milena and Paul, how did the international community respond to
these developments?
MILENA STERIO: One of the things that happened is that the United
Nations Security Council adopted several resolutions related to North
Korea. There actually have been a total of twenty-one resolutions on
North Korea since the 1950s, but nine resolutions which imposed
crippling sanctions against North Korea over the past twelve years or
so, the last of which was just a few months ago. 25 The sanctions ended
up being tightened up over the years and imposed on several sectors
of the North Korean economy, including on North Korean exports.
And the idea, obviously, of sanctions is to try to persuade without use
of force the North Korean government to cease and desist from
developing a nuclear weapons arsenal.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So that was the stick. Paul, can you tell us about
any carrots that were attempted?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Yeah, in addition to the sticks that Milena had
mentioned, the international community launched the six-party
talks—which included the United States, North Korea, South Korea,
as well as China, Japan, and Russia. 26 And it was an off and on
negotiation—and I should note that when the negotiations were off,
the North Koreans were testing their nuclear weapons, their missiles,
their rockets. 27 And in fact, just a year prior to the announcement of
these talks, the North Koreans had done significant testing. 28 And
every year since 2013, they’ve tested their nuclear weapons capability
or further refined it, while at the same time saying they were
interested in negotiations and talks to end that program. 29
22.

Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Kelsey Davenport, UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea,
CONTROL
ASS’N
(last
updated
Jan.
2018),
ARMS
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-CouncilResolutions-on-North-Korea.

26.

Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2.

27.

Id.

28.

Id.

29.

Kelsey Davenport, Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and
Missile Diplomacy: 2013, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (last updated Dec.
2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2013.
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MICHAEL SCHARF: Alright. So, then after Donald Trump was
elected president, the leaders of the two countries began to use ever
more threatening rhetoric in their conversation over Twitter and press
releases. Let me provide a few quotes to give the listening audience an
idea of what I’m talking about. So first, the president of North Korea,
Kim Jong-un, he said:
The whole of the US mainland is within our nuclear strike
range. The nuclear button is always on my table. The US must
realize that this is not a threat, but reality. 30

Now, Donald Trump responds:
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un just said the ‘nuclear button
is on his desk at all times.’ Will someone from his depleted, food
starved regime please inform him that I too have a button, but
it is a much bigger and more powerful one than his, and my
button works! 31

Trump also said, “Kim Jong-un of North Korea, who is obviously
a mad man who doesn’t mind starving or killing his people, will be
tested like never before!” 32 And Kim responded, “I will surely and
definitely tame the deranged US dotard with fire.” 33 And at that
point a lot of people looked up the word “dotard.” [Laughter] Trump
then responds, “They will be met with fire and fury like the world has
never seen.” 34 And now, let me asks the panelists, how unusual is this
30.

Bruce Harrison et al., Kim Highlights ‘nuclear button’ On His Desk,
Offers Olympic Talks, NBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2017, 9:58 PM)
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/kim-says-north-korea-snuclear-weapons-will-prevent-war-n833781 (last visited Nov 4, 2018).

31.

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 2, 2018, 7:49
PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/948355557022420992?lang
=en.

32.

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 22, 2017, 5:28
AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/911175246853664768?ref_
src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E91117524
6853664768&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F2017%2F09%
2F22%2Fpolitics%2Fdonald-trump-north-korea-insultstimeline%2Findex.html.

33.

Anna Fifield, Kim Jong Un Calls Trump a ‘mentally deranged U.S.
Dotard’,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
21,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/09/21/nor
th-korean-leader-to-trump-i-will-surely-and-definitely-tame-the-mentallyderanged-u-s-dotard-with-fire/.

34.

Jonathan Ernst, Trump Says North Korea Will Be Met with ‘fire and
fury’ if it Threatens U.S., REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2017, 3:40 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-usa-
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kind of rhetoric to be coming from two presidents of sovereign
countries in the world today? Anybody? Tim.
TIM WEBSTER: Well, from North Korea’s side, it’s actually pretty
common. This kind of bellicose, very floral, very over the top
language is just sort of de rigueur, that’s the way they communicate.
You can see this parodied in popular culture from Thirty Rock, 35 the
great TV show with Tina Fey, to The Interview, a movie starring
James Franco and Seth Rogan. 36 So, you know, it’s no surprise that
North Korea uses this kind of language. What is surprising and what
is sort of unprecedented, is that we have an American President
playing along. Usually, they say nothing, or occasionally they’ll make
an off the cuff insult. George Bush called Kim Jong-Il “a pygmy,”37
you know, those kinds of things. But we’ve never seen this sort of
back and forth, and of course Trump loves the drama. He loves the
angst. He loves the limelight. And that’s why you have this exchange
of heightened and fiery rhetoric.
MICHAEL SCHARF: How dangerous do you think this is? Shannon?
SHANNON FRENCH: What bothers me is that it’s so petulant and
undignified, and it seems to not take into account the moral weight of
the kinds of decisions that are on the table here. So, it comes across
like a game with schoolboys, but the stakes are too high for that.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, then on March 8th, in the middle of all this
rhetoric, President Trump announces that he is willing to sit down
with Kim Jong-un for a nuclear peace summit. 38 Tim, as an Asian
specialist, how do you explain the sudden turnabout?
TIM WEBSTER: If you go back to the campaign trail, Trump said on a
number of occasions that he would be willing to sit down and talk to
Kim Jong-un. 39 He said he wanted to open a dialogue, he said there

trump/trump-says-north-korea-will-be-met-with-fire-and-fury-if-itthreatens-u-s-idUSKBN1AO28O.
35.

30 Rock (Universal Media Studios & Universal Television, Seasons 5 &
6).

36.

THE INTERVIEW (Point Grey Pictures & LStar Capital 2014).

37.

Helene Cooper, Bush Writes to North Korean Leader, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
6,
2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/06/world/asia/06cndkorea.html.

38.

Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2.

39.

Steven Holland & Emily Flitter, Exclusive: Trump Would Talk to North
Korea’s Kim, Wants to Renegotiate Climate Accord, REUTERS (May 17,
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was no problem with that. And in making that kind of
pronouncement, Trump is doing just what Obama did when Obama
was a candidate in 2008. 40 Even towards the end of the Clinton
administration in 2000, Clinton said, “I’m willing to go meet with
Kim Jong-Il,” who was Kim Jong-un’s father. Clinton, of course sent
his Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, who then met with Kim
Jong-Il, 41 but this would have been the first meeting between sitting
presidents or sitting leaders of the two countries. So, was it a big
turnabout? I think once it became clear that North Korea could
actually hit the U.S. with a nuclear missile, that changed the stakes.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Shannon, how do you read it?
SHANNON FRENCH: I agree that this move is in response to some of
the technological advances by North Korea, but it also shows what I
would almost want to call a weird kind of optimism on the part of
President Trump—that he thinks he can make some kind of dramatic
change or shift that we haven’t seen in the past, precisely by doing
what hasn’t been done in the past. But, it ignores the lessons of
history.
MICHAEL SCHARF: And Milena, do you take this at face value? Or are
you more cynical?
MILENA STERIO: You can go ahead and announce a big summit, but I
think if you want to be successful, if you want to actually achieve
something at that summit, almost all diplomacy experts would agree
that there is a ton of work that would need to be done in advance of
the summit. There is so much that would need to be pre-negotiated
before the summit. So, to go ahead and announce that in two weeks
the President of the United States is going to meet with the President
of North Korea, it’s really posturing more than anything else. And it’s

2016, 5:03 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trumpexclusive-idUSKCN0Y82JO.
40.

Bryon York, Obama, without Preconditions or Preparation, NATIONAL
REVIEW
(July
23,
2008,
4:55
PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/obama-without-preconditionsor-preparation-byron-york/.

41.

Anna Fifield, David Nakamura & Seung Min Kim, Trump Accepts
Invitation to Meet with North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un, WASH.
POST
(Mar.
8,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/north-koreanleader-kim-jong-un-has-invited-president-trump-to-ameeting/2018/03/08/021cb070-2322-11e8-badd7c9f29a55815_story.html?utm_term=.e7f7c09400ad.
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unrealistic to think that in such a short time frame, you can actually
achieve a true peace treaty.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, you never really thought that the Summit was
going to happen, or not on June 12 at least.
MILENA STERIO: Well I either thought it wasn’t going to happen, or I
thought if it does happen then nothing much will actually come out of
it, and if anything Donald Trump could then say “you know, I tried. I
went there and I tried, and they wouldn’t agree to anything.”
MICHAEL SCHARF: So then on May 24th, President Trump, perhaps
predictably, sent the following message to Kim Jong-un, and of course
he released it for wide publication in every newspaper around the
world:
Sadly, based on the tremendous anger and open hostility
displayed in your most recent statements, I feel that it is
inappropriate at this time to have this long-planned meeting.
Therefore, please let this letter represent that the Singapore
Summit, for the good of both parties, but to the detriment of
the world, will not take place. 42

Trump goes on to say, “You talk about your nuclear capabilities,
but ours are so massive and powerful that I pray to God that they
will never have to be used.” 43 Kind of a thinly veiled threat there.
Well when we return after our short break, our experts are going to
tell us what they make of this latest turn of events, whether they
think the summit ever will take place, and what’s at stake. We’ll be
back in just a moment.
---- [Station break] ----

MICHAEL SCHARF: Welcome back to Talking Foreign Policy, brought
to you by Case Western Reserve University and WCPN 90.3 idea
stream. I’m Michael Scharf, Dean of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law. I’m joined today by famed peace negotiator, Dr. Paul
Williams, military ethicist, Dr. Shannon French, international law
guru, Associate Dean Melina Sterio, and an Asian Affairs expert,
Professor Tim Webster. We’re talking today about the prospects of a
U.S.-North Korean Summit. It’s really extraordinary that two
countries with such acrimonious relations seem to be at the verge of
42.

David E. Sanger, Trump’s Letter to Kim Canceling North Korea
Summit Meeting, Annotated, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/asia/read-trumps-letterto-kim-jong-un.html.

43.

Id.
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actually holding peace talks. Let me begin with Tim Webster, and
ask, assuming there is going to be a summit at some point, what
would the United States be getting in return for agreeing to these
talks?
TIM WEBSTER: First a word about what Kim Jung-un gets. When
Donald Trump, or any other U.S. president stands next to and
appears in a photo-op with the North Korean leader, that is of
tremendous propaganda value for North Korea and for the idea that
Kim Jung-un is of equal stature with the world’s great leaders. For
Trump, the U.S. has for decades tried to denuclearize the Korean
Peninsula. The long-term goal of the U.S. is the complete, verifiable,
and irreversible denuclearization of the peninsula. 44 Recently, Kim
Jong-un had suggested that they would suspend missile launches, they
would suspend nuclear tests, they would dismantle one of their
nuclear test sites, which they actually did today, apparently, in view
of journalists. 45 So, those were sort of steps seen as a path forward to
a total denuclearization. But with the tossing out of the Summit
recently, it’s not clear that those will move forward. But the longterm strategy, the long-term plan of the U.S., is the complete
denuclearization of the peninsula. 46
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, earlier in the broadcast, Paul Williams was
telling us that back in 2002, when North Korea decided to start
engaging in the development of nuclear weapons, 47 North Korean
leaders did that for their own protection. And I want to return to
that thought with you, Paul. What was going on in the rest of the
world that would have made North Korea feel that they needed
nuclear weapons to protect themselves from the United States?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, I think the North Koreans have always been
paranoid about their survivability. There was the end of the Cold
War, there was the reduction of nuclear weapons stock piles around
the globe, and there was a sense that there was a changing time and
that, you know, the clock was running out for dictators like Muamar
44.

David Welna, ‘Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible’ A Tough Goal For
North Korea Summit, NPR (June 6, 2018, 5:57 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/06/617619192/complete-verifiableirreversible-a-tough-goal-for-north-korea-summit.

45.

Reuters, North Korea Hosts Media to See Closing of Nuclear Site, N.Y.
POST
(May
23,
2018,
8:02
AM),
https://nypost.com/2018/05/23/foreign-media-journey-to-see-northkorea-dismantle-nuclear-test-site/ (last visited Nov 4, 2018).

46.

Welna, supra note 44.

47.

Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2.
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Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, and Kim Jong-ill , and that if they wanted
to keep their family totalitarian regime going in North Korea, they
needed some kind of bargaining chip to put on the table. 48 And
nuclear weapons were the most obvious.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, Paul, what about the rhetoric and events
leading to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq? Do you think those played
any role?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, I think it was very clear at the time that the
United States was willing to engage in a regime change in order to
protect its strategic interests. You know there was the actions in
Afghanistan, 49 the actions in Iraq, 50 there was Libya giving up its
nuclear weapons around that time in exchange for economic
inducements, 51 and the North Koreans simply thought “we need to go
nuclear in order to preserve our quote unquote ‘way of life’” as they
like to call it in North Korea.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, based on that, Paul, do you think there’s any
real possibility that Kim Jong-un will actually give up all of his
nuclear weapons, which seem to be not only the source of his power
and security, but perhaps his very life?
PAUL WILLIAMS: No.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Care to elaborate?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Kim likes to put denuclearization on the table, and
he often does that months before he conducts a dramatic test or a
dramatic leap is made in their nuclear capacity. So, this whole notion
of “oh we’re willing to denuclearize” came up quite often in the sixparty talks. 52 It’s one of their talking points that they use to induce
48.
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the United States. As Tim said, what does the United States want? It
wants denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Kim says “Hey, I’ll
denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, can we have a summit, can we go
to Singapore, can I get a photo-op, can I get sanctions lifted, can we
enter into long and tortuous negotiations which will yield me both
psychological as well as economic benefit?” But, it’s going to be very,
very difficult for the North Koreans to give up those weapons if they
want to continue the tyrannical regime that they use to govern or
oppress their people.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well and there’s two ways that could go. One
possibility is negotiations that go on and on and never bear fruit. The
other is negotiations that bear fruit in terms of signing an agreement
but then are cheated upon afterward. And let me ask Milena, our
expert in international law, based on past precedent, such as in Iraq
and Libya, how could the U.S. ensure that a deal with North Korea
was verifiable? What would happen if North Korea did cheat?
MILENA STERIO: So, imagine a peace treaty, where North Korea
agrees to gradually reduce and then destroy its arsenal of nuclear
technology. There could be a verification inspection regime set up. It
also depends if this is negotiated just between the United States and
North Korea, or if there is an international organization involved.
When it comes to other countries, there have been other international
organizations involved in those verification inspection regimes. For
example, the International Atomic Energy Agency 53 and the
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty organization. 54 Those
organizations can send inspectors to the relevant countries, and
basically engage in inspection and verification. But that requires the
agreement and cooperation by the relevant countries. 55 So North
Korea would have to accept those inspections, and if it cheated then
sanctions could be re-imposed. If we’re talking about U.S. sanctions,
then the U.S. government is obviously free to reimpose sanctions. If
we’re talking about U.N. sanctions typically the Security Council
would have to vote to reimpose sanctions. 56
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MICHAEL SCHARF: Not too long ago, something like this was tried
for Syria to take away its chemical weapons. 57 How well did that
work?
MILENA STERIO: Right, there is precedent here. I think the North
Koreans are focused not so much on Syria but on Iraq and Libya,
which you already mentioned. From the North Korean perspective,
they’re looking at Iraq and Libya, where there was an inspection
regime put in place. 58 You could make the argument that Gaddafi,
the Libyan leader in 2003, really tried to respect the investigation and
verification regime related to the destruction of his chemical weapons.
Ultimately, that road resulted in regime change and Gaddafi’s
death. 59 As for Iraq, after Saddam Hussein was weakened by the
Security Council obligations that Iraq undertook after the 1991
Persian Gulf War, there was the 2003 U.S. invasion, and Saddam
Hussein was ultimately convicted and put to death. 60 From the North
Korean perspective of looking at these precedents, I’m skeptical, like
Paul, because I really don’t see what’s in it for them. Looking at these
precedents, they might say, “Even if we agree now this might not
work out for us so well.”
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, in both of those cases there was U.S. use of
force. You were talking about reimposition of sanctions, but shouldn’t
we also be talking about enforcement through force? What if North
Korea cheats, the U.S. could say, “Ah we gave them the chance, we
entered into this treaty. They’ve cheated, and now we’re going to
invade. Now we’re going to have forcible regime change?”
MILENA STERIO: For the use of force in international law, there are
basically only two situations when a country can legally use force
against another sovereign country. Those two situations are: Security
57.
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Council authorization or self-defense. 61 With Security Council
authorization, the problem is we’re in this dynamic where Russia and
China are often vetoing resolutions brought forth by the United
States. 62 With respect to North Korea, they might veto a resolution
attempting to authorize the use of force against North Korea. In the
other situation, self-defense, the United States would have to make
the argument that North Korea, by not respecting the deal, whatever
the deal is, is a threat to the United States and is about to somehow
harm the United States. Then we can act in self-defense. That would
have to be the legal argument.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, does it strengthen that legal argument to
say, “Look, we tried everything. We tried negotiating a treaty, and
they cheated. They’ve got these nuclear weapons, and we feel like our
security is at stake. We’ve tried everything reasonable that anyone
could, so now we’re going to resort to force?” Does that strengthen
the argument?
MILENA STERIO: If you could make the argument that North Korea
was actually threatening to use nuclear weapons against the United
States.
MICHAEL SCHARF: What about all those quotes I read just a moment
ago?
MILENA STERIO: It depends on how seriously you’re going to take
those quotes. Is that just posturing or is that actual, real, threats
against the United States? They’re all sorts of creative self-defense
arguments that have already been made by the United States. For
example, with respect to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States
made creative, sort of anticipatory self-defense arguments based on
Iraq’s alleged possession of chemical weapons. 63 And you can
certainly, you know, go there again. But, legally speaking, I think it
would be a difficult argument.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, we’ve been focusing on the nukes. But Paul
and Tim, let me ask you—on the last broadcast of “Talking Foreign
Policy,” we had former Judge of the International Court of Justice,
Tom Buergenthal, on the air with us. He compared North Korea to
61.
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Nazi Germany in terms of its human rights abuses. If you remember,
he said that he was part of a recent investigation of the human rights
situation in North Korea. 64 He said that the atrocities were worse
than what happened to him when he was in a concentration camp
during World War II in Nazi Germany. So, let me ask the two of you:
should the U.S. be insisting, if we’re going to have talks with North
Korea, that they include the human rights record as well as nukes?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Yes. They clearly should. The Americans should be
insisting that these human rights violations be included in the talks,
and that mechanisms be created in order to minimize or stop these
human rights violations. We’re talking about mass starvation,
concentration camps, extensive torture, and executions. 65 But the
reality is they won’t be included in the talks. The “holy grail,” so to
speak, of these talks is a denuclearized Korean peninsula and
normalization in one of the hottest areas in which we have a strategic
interest. I don’t think that this administration is willing to put the
human rights on the table for fear that it may scuttle a nuclear deal.66
Although, as others have pointed out, we’re not going to be able to
have a long-term sustainable nuclear deal or sustainable relationship
with North Korea with these ongoing starvations, mass killings, and
mass torture.
MICHAEL SCHARF: But, if there was a hierarchy of U.S. national
interests at play here, wouldn’t you say denuclearizing North Korea is
way more important than achieving human rights for the people of
North Korea? That that comes into play maybe a few years down the
line after we’ve accomplished the more important goal? Could you
make that argument?
TIM WEBSTER: Sure. Certainly from an American perspective, the
biggest threat is the nuclear threat. But if we’re talking about the 22
million North Koreans that are living under this repressive regime,
there are a separate set of strategies that need to be pursued. I would
just add, and I agree with almost all that Paul said, that human
64.
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rights isn’t something that Trump has expressed much interest in.67
Even prior presidencies, the Obama administration, the Clinton
administration, and even George Bush – those were administrations
that put a lot of emphasis on human rights. But if you go back and
look at the agreements that they struck with North Korea, you never
see the words “human rights.” 68 So, it’s certainly a tool we can use,
but if you go back, to echo what Paul said, when push comes to
shove, what we’re focused on, what we really need to prioritize is the
denuclearization.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, Shannon, you’re an ethicist. How does this
strike you?
SHANNON FRENCH: Well, I mean, one of the overall issues here is
whether or not this is like negotiating with terrorists. And, as I think
about that, and think about what’s on the table here, we’re talking
about a bad actor who has not shown any signs of improving any of
his actions. Now, we have to be realistic to some extent. There’s
always a point—at least, we hope there will be a point—with most
rogue or even terrorist regimes where they try to make a transition to
be a legitimate political power. And finding that exact moment isn’t
easy. And one of the trickier aspects of diplomacy is recognizing when
the time is right for such a transition. Think about, for example,
when the United Kingdom decided to start doing quiet negotiations
with Sinn Féin and the IRA. 69 But, if you begin down that route you
have to realize it can’t be something that is a quick, early, public
move that seems to legitimize the other party before they’ve begun to
show improvements. 70 And frankly, if we again look at history, the
better approach seems to be to bring in third parties and have some
early framework done where you stand off with some moral high
ground to say “I can’t talk to them, obviously. But hey, my friends
over here are going to quietly talk to you and see if you’re serious
about making real change,” and build very slowly. I worry deeply, as
an ethicist, about what kind of message we might be sending, not just
to North Korea, but to the entire world, if we say “Oh! You want to
talk? Well bygones. We’re not going to worry about anything you’ve
done before. Let’s see where we can get from this point.”
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MICHAEL SCHARF: But at least the Trump administration’s
position seems to be: “We will talk, and if you do not do what we
want, then we will use force,” as opposed to past presidents that have
said, “We will talk with you, and we will buy your cooperation with
economic assistance.” There were agreements that we reached with
North Korea by past administrations, where we gave them billions of
dollars in economic assistance in return for their promise, which they
didn’t keep, to get rid of the nuclear weapons. 71 Which of those two
approaches do you think is more ethical? One where you tell them,
“behave or we will hurt you” or one where we say, “We will make
your lives very, very, good if you behave?”
SHANNON FRENCH: Well, I’m not a huge fan of either, because they’re
both ways of negotiating with rogue or terrorist States. And I come
back to the idea that they shouldn’t be given a seat at the table, until
they make some moves and concessions. So, all of this is backwards.
We’re starting with the, “If you will start to do something then these
are the following consequences,” instead of just saying, “We’re going
to sit here and wait for you to do something positive. Then, and only
then, will we do anything meaningful.” And I would like to say that,
even as I put that out there, that I don’t count as something positive
some of these showy, but ultimately meaningless, moves by North
Korea. Like the blowing up of these testing sites that can be
reconstituted or might not be needed or were damaged anyway. 72
That’s meaningless. That doesn’t impress me much.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Paul, lets return to you to talk about the full
range of carrots in the U.S. arsenal of negotiations. In addition to just
throwing money or threatening force, what other kinds of things are
North Korea looking for with respect to a final peace negotiation?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, one of the things that is quite often forgotten
is the North Koreans are quite interested in the reunification of the
Korean Peninsula. Now, when we hear this we think, “Well, why
would they be interested in reunification? That would simply be the
south reincorporating the North to its dynamic capitalistic society
and democratic structure.” But the North actually thinks it could
govern all of Korea and could incorporate the South Koreans into the
71.
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regime structure of the North. 73 It’s also about being a regional
strategic player. At the moment, Kim is isolated. He’s the one that’s
seen as the bad actor. But he sees a deal with the United States as a
way of bringing him tremendous political power and prestige in the
region. And I think that’s been under appreciated. And in particular,
returning to Tim’s point, if he gets a summit, if he gets to sort of do
the foxtrot with the United States, it’s of huge value. So, you blow up
a few old labs and launch platforms, you say yet again that you’re
going to denuclearize, and you get to go to Singapore for a summit
and get a photo op. That’s going to add huge domestic and regional
influence for Kim. And then there’s economic issues.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Tim, Paul was talking about the reunification idea.
This is not just the North’s idea. South Korea also very much wants
reunification, isn’t that correct?
TIM WEBSTER: Well, South Korea wants to reunify along the South
Korean model. 74
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, what if they decide to go ahead and
negotiate a reunification structure? Could the U.S. block it? Should
the U.S. block it?
TIM WEBSTER: No, the two Korean leaders could negotiate a
reunification. But then they would be looking to the Americans to
pay for it. It would be hugely expensive to bring the North Korean
economic infrastructure into that of South Korea, and a huge drain on
the South Korean economy. 75 So, we couldn’t block it, but we’d have
to pay for it.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, and then there are other aspects to this. The
U.S. has a lot of troops in South Korea to protect it from the North.76
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Would the U.S. have to pull those troops out as part of the
agreement?
TIM WEBSTER: The North Koreans are very clear that they want the
American troops to leave in exchange for denuclearization. 77 And the
Americans are very clear that having our troops there is crucial to our
military strategic interest, both on the Korean peninsula as well as in
that part of Asia. It’s one of those catch 22s that is exceedingly
difficult to navigate during negotiations.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well it’s time for another short break. When we
return, we’ll talk about what the details of a negotiation between the
U.S. and North Korea would look like, and what’s at stake if the
Summit is permanently shelved.
---- [Station break] ----

MICHAEL SCHARF: This is Michael Scharf, and we’re back with
Talking Foreign Policy. I’m joined today by some of the foremost
experts on negotiating with rogue nations. We’ve been talking about
the prospects of a U.S.-North Korean Summit. In this final segment of
our broadcast, I want to ask our experts what advice they would have
for the negotiators if, there was, in fact, a North Korea summit? But
before we talk about what should be on the negotiating table, I’d like
to ask Asian Affairs expert, Tim Webster, who should be at the
negotiating table? You had mentioned earlier that China and maybe
Russia should play a part. Why?
TIM WEBSTER: I’m not sure I would say Russia. I hope Russia is not
invited to the party. But I think China, as the economic, security,
and military guarantor of North Korea, has to be there. North Korea
doesn’t exist without the economic lifeline of China. Whether you’re
talking about trade, loans, investment, North Korea has to have
China support to survive. And I think you also need to have South
Korea at the table. At the end of April, North Korea and South
Korea signed something called the Panmunjom Declaration, 78 and
they said “Look, going forward, these talks will either be three
party—North Korea, South Korea, U.S.—or four party—North Korea,
South Korea, U.S., and China.” So, we need to understand that the
South Koreans obviously need to have a seat at the table for this to
77.
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succeed. I think what’s gone unnoticed, at least in this country, is all
the quiet backstage maneuvering that the current South Korean
President, Moon Jae-in, has done to get us this far. So, if there is a
summit it didn’t come about because Trump talks big—it was made
possible because South Korean President Moon Jae-in has been
working like a madman. You know, go back to the Olympics and the
impressive diplomatic coup de tat he pulled off by having the South
and the North on the same team together, for the women’s ice hockey
team, and inviting North Korean leaders down to participate in the
ceremonies. Those efforts I think, and even coming to Washington to
council President Trump earlier this week, are what made the
difference. So, South Korea, of course, needs to be at the table. It
wants denuclearization as well, but as we talked about, there are a
whole range of other issues South Korea would want to address in
these kinds of talks. 79 I think four-party talks involving those four
actors are probably the best. I think Russia is going to be a spoiler.
Six-party talks also included Japan. There is a role, I suppose, for
Japan here. In previous manifestations, Japan has played the role of
economic advisor. 80 Japan would be there to fund the peaceful nuclear
reactors that North Korea would ultimately get. But I think either
three- or four-party talks are really the way to move forward on this.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, Paul Williams in the last three years you’ve
been shuttling back and forth to Geneva for the peace talks regarding
Syria, and those peace talks are multi-party talks. Based on that
experience, what can you tell our listeners about the pros and cons of
bilateral talks versus the multi-party approach?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, bilateral talks are a lot easier, you can control
half of the agenda, you can control half of the negotiations because
you’re one of two parties. When you need to develop a strategy, you
only need to get your team to come to an agreement on that strategy
which, as we’ve seen with the preparations for this potential summit,
it’s exceedingly difficult just to get your own team, your own
secretary of state, your own national security advisor, to agree upon
what are your priorities, what’s the negotiation process going to look
like. Tim’s right, you do have to involve the Chinese, probably the
Japanese, definitely the South Koreans, but that makes it exceedingly
difficult, because it’s essentially the North Koreans on one side
negotiating with the four other members across the table, and that
makes it much more difficult to get to “yes” and to get to “yes”
effectively where your priorities are on the table, because the Chinese,
79.
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the Japanese, the South Koreans, and the Americans don’t all have
the same priorities. 81 They do big-picture—denuclearization 82—but in
terms of a number of the other issues, there’s complete disagreement
between the Americans and definitely the Chinese, 83 and there is even
daylight between the U.S. position and that of our allies the South
Koreans and the Japanese. 84 So, it’s going to be complicated enough,
and that only makes it more multi-dimensional.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, when you’re talking about complicated peace
negotiations, how all-important do you think it is that the negotiating
team have a lot of experience?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well it’s…
MICHAEL SCHARF: Do you think that’s a loaded question?
PAUL WILLIAMS: That’s a loaded question. This is not the same as
negotiating a real estate deal. I think this is part of the dilemma that
we’re facing here is we have a president who is very effective at a
certain type of negotiation and a certain process and that’s what
they’ve, you know, the tweets that you read earlier, the let’s go mano
a mano, let’s meet in Singapore, let’s hash something out, that’s how
you buy a hotel; it’s not how you denuclearize a country. I think what
we’re going to have to have, and I think there’s people on the team
that can do this, is a clear set of priorities, a clear understanding of
the timeline. It could take several years of intermediate steps to
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denuclearize the Korean peninsula; 85 it won’t happen quickly. And
you’re going to need a very detailed follow-on negotiation process, we
keep talking about the summit, the two folks getting together and
hammering something out beyond just shutting down the reactors.
What do you do with the existing nuclear material and missiles, and
then who’s going to pay for it? The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
with the U.S.S.R. cost the Americans two billion dollars to help the
Russians get rid of some of their nuclear weapons, and it has cost
another half a billion over the last ten years to monitor. 86 Are we
going to pay for this?
MICHAEL SCHARF: Paul, how difficult do you think it makes for
successful negotiations that the U.S. doesn’t currently have an
ambassador to Korea, there’s no current U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asia and the Pacific, there’s no State Department
expert on North Korea, that person just retired, I believe there’s no
arms control expert—a big chunk of the experts who normally would
be involved in these kinds of negotiations have not been appointed. 87
How difficult is that going to make successful negotiations?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Okay, let’s be honest, this is a real test of President
Trump’s mantra of “we’ve been getting it wrong before, there’s a new
sheriff in town, we’re going to do things differently.” So if you were to
list off these positions to the top officials on the Trump team they’d
shrug their shoulders and say “yeah, yeah, but those are the guys,
those are the positions, those are the institutional interests that
brought us the last twenty years of failed policy in North Korea; we
need fresh ideas, we need a new dynamic, we need a new process.” I
think we’re going to find that it’s not as easy as just bringing in a
new team with fresh ideas, that the depth of knowledge that’s
required to denuclearize the Korean peninsula is substantial, and
without that knowledge, and I think this recent sort of push back or
85.
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this abrogation of the summit is an example of that, it’s like, wow,
this actually is more complicated than just negotiating over Twitter.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well we do have John Bolton. Now, let me remind
the listeners about John Bolton, he is someone with a lot of
experience during both the senior and younger Bush administrations;
he was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations,
he was Ambassador to the United Nations, and he was Deputy
Secretary of State. 88 So this is a man with a lot of experience that has
now been made the new National Security Advisor to the President. 89
Any of our panelists, what do you think the entrance of John Bolton
into this calculus means? Tim?
TIM WEBSTER: Sure, so another fact about John Bolton is during his
time with the younger Bush administration, the U.S. presented
evidence to the world that North Korea was not abiding by the
framework that the Clinton administration had agreed to in 1994, and
John Bolton rather triumphantly said “aha, this is the hammer I have
been searching for to destroy this agreement.” 90 So John Bolton is the
guy on the Bush Team who killed the first North Korea deal that had
been in place at that time for eight years. So you have that aspect,
you also have his comments last week about aspiring to a Libya
model. 91 We already talked about what happened to Muammar
Gaddafi earlier in the program, we don’t need to revisit that, but that
wasn’t a particularly helpful way to advance discussions with North
Korea, especially given North Korea’s support for Gaddafi at the
time. 92
MICHAEL SCHARF: In a way, you’re being almost too diplomatic in
describing this. I think that one could say that John Bolton’s
statements about the Libya model fueled the response of Kim, which
88.
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directly led to the President’s announcement on May 24th that he
was pulling out of the talks.
MILENA STERIO: It started with John Bolton but then also Mike
Pence had said some things about that, basically referring to the
Libya Model which, from the North Korean perspective, is certainly
not a good model because, again as I explained earlier, although you
could make the argument that Gaddafi in 2003 agreed to a regime of
inspection and verification, and perhaps even abided by the terms of
that deal, ultimately there was a regime change in Libya, his regime
was toppled and this resulted in his death. 93 So if you’re North Korea
you’re looking at this, you see that people like John Bolton and Mike
Pence are referring to this, you certainly would not be rushing to a
summit in Singapore. 94
MICHAEL SCHARF: But wasn’t this actually a giant misunderstanding?
Pence, I think, described it one way, but that’s not really what
Bolton meant by the Libya model, is it?
MILENA STERIO: I think Bolton was actually referring just to the 2003
agreement where Libya actually agreed to dismantle its weapons of
mass destruction. 95 So, I think Bolton was looking at it as like, this
can actually be done, this was done once before and an authoritarian
regime agreed to essentially destroy its arsenal.
MICHAEL SCHARF: And then it was Pence who then spun it and said
this means if you don’t comply, we have a regime change, and that
got things off. 96
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MILENA STERIO: Exactly, and that’s when the North Korean Vice
Minister for Foreign Affairs called Pence stupid and ignorant, and
then this basically sparked Trump’s response to say this is now
cancelled. 97
PAUL WILLIAMS: Michael, if I could just jump in real quick, I think
this highlights some of the concerns that those of us around the
microphone have been expressing. I think Bolton made a serious effort
at saying yeah, there’s a Libya model; in 2003 they agreed, by 2004
the Libyans were shipping the components of their weapons program
to the United States in exchange for economic inducements and
economic trade, 98 and that was actually working. Completely separate
from that, there was the 2011 revolution in Libya, which led to the
regime change and the killing of Gaddafi by his own people. I think
Bolton was essentially saying “look, if we are going to do this, here’s a
roadmap,” and then others in the administration who didn’t actually
grasp what had happened in 2003-2004 heard Libya, “regime change,
yeah let’s go that model.” And now we have, as Milena laid out, it’s
falling apart. Because the core team did not understand that there are
two parts, that there’s a Libya model for denuclearization and then
there’s the Libyan revolution—completely different, completely
unrelated. That lack of sophistication has crippled, at least in the
short-term, what was going to be a summit to denuclearize the
Korean Peninsula.
MICHAEL SCHARF: But maybe not, everything the President tweets or
says today doesn’t mean it’s going to be his position tomorrow. Paul,
isn’t it possible that this is just another bargaining ploy by President
Trump and that we’ll be back at the table maybe not on June 12th,
but soon thereafter?
PAUL WILLIAMS: It’s not a bargaining ploy, it’s stalling for time. I
think there was a realization that this is exceedingly complicated,
that shockingly, our team, Team America, is not prepared for this,
and that the misunderstanding and recriminations have created an
opportunity to basically pause and get our act together. The North
Koreans have been preparing for this bilateral engagement for a really
long time. We’ve been preparing for two weeks, and this gives us a
couple more weeks maybe to prepare and come up with an actual
plan.
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MICHAEL SCHARF: Alright, so there’s some optimism that this is not
the end of the talks. Shannon, let me go the other route, though, with
you and do a thought experiment. What do you think would happen
if the talks are permanently cancelled?
SHANNON FRENCH: Well, I think first of all, as we’ve already
experienced, we’ll see a return to very angry rhetoric on both sides,
but the other things that I think that will happen most likely, South
Korea isn’t going to just give this up, so South Korea will probably
try to restart the negotiations with the North and perhaps play off
what has happened with the US as a way to come closer to the North
or make some arrangements there. We’ll probably see more nuclear
testing by Kim Jong-un as again a way of acting out in response to
that, but there are other things we can expect, like a decline in U.S.China relations, even further. And one thing that I’m aware of from
my travels to Japan is there has already been a lot of increased
political pressure in Japan to amp up their move towards rearming99
and they’ve even started talking about how quickly could they
become nuclear. 100 In light of that kind of a breakdown, and Japan is
already feeling a sense of insecurity around whether they are truly
protected anymore by the U.S., I think it would be reasonable for
that worry to reemerge, that Japan is going to say, look we can’t
count on anyone, we need to make sure that we have that precious
nuclear umbrella, too.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, let’s take this scenario to the extreme.
Shannon you’re the author of a book titled The Code of the
Warrior. 101 Let’s assume that things go off the rails completely, as
Milena said there’s maybe a legal argument the U.S. can make for use
of force, and if we do use force, what does that kind of military
engagement look like, what are the casualties likely to be?
SHANNON FRENCH: Well this is where it gets truly horrific, and I
think that Secretary of Defense Mattis made the point with a single
word; he said that if we got into a military conflict with North Korea
it would be “catastrophic.” 102 But just to make that real, there are the
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obvious targets -- barracks, troop concentrations, artillery, nuclear
facilities, command and control, all of that can be predicted. But
what we need to talk about is the human cost, and in late 2017, the
Department of Defense itself did an estimate of what that human cost
might be, and it estimated as a very conservative number around
twenty to thirty thousand dead per day. 103 As high as six figures have
been discussed. 104 There are 100,000 Americans in South Korea, both
military and civilian. 105 So what we’re talking about here in real
human terms is, to make a local reference, within ten days the
equivalent of the population of Cincinnati would be dead. This cannot
be a light decision.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Alright, so with that in mind, I’m much more
optimistic that we’re going to end up seeing the two countries get
back to the peace table.
SHANNON FRENCH: I certainly hope so.
MICHAEL SCHARF: This may be, as Paul said, just a stall while the
U.S. gets its act together. Tim, if these talks are eventually held,
what do you think the benchmarks for gauging their success should
be?
TIM WEBSTER: Obviously we need to have some plan that lays out
with admirable detail the steps towards complete denuclearization.
That’s a very long, multiple stage process, but something that spells
out step-by-step, U.S. does this, North Korea does this, U.S. does this,
North Korea does this, and so on and so forth. And I think the clearer
the picture you have of what each step means, the likelier you are
that both parties will actually fulfill that. We’ve had an agreement
before with North Korea in 1994, as I mentioned, but immediately
after it was signed, you had the Republican revolution, you had Newt
Gingrich coming into town, and everybody including John McCain
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criticizing Clinton for going ahead with it. 106 So, if we can have some
agreement on what the steps will be, a timeline perhaps, or some
other very clear roadmap that spells out how we get to complete
denuclearization, that I think is what we should be looking for, and
then, of course the other bugbear here is the implementation itself,
and as Paul mentioned, it would be a many year timeline, and it’s
difficult, I think, for our politicians to think along those long
timeframes.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well the stakes could not be higher for the
eventual U.S.-North Korea Summit, which I think we all hope will
eventually take place. We need to wrap up our program now. Paul
Williams, Shannon French, Milena Sterio, and Tim Webster, thank
you all for providing your insights about the prospects and pitfalls for
a summit between the United States and one of its oldest adversaries.
I’m Michael Scharf, you’ve been listening to Talking Foreign Policy.
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